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Abstract—Blockchain is a popular method to ensure security
for trusted systems. The benefits include an auditable method
to provide decentralized security without a trusted third party,
but the drawback is the large computational resources needed to
process and store the ever-expanding chain of security blocks.
The promise of blockchain for edge devices (e.g., internet of
things) poses a variety of challenges and strategies before
adoption. In this paper, we explore blockchain methods and
examples, with experimental data to determine the merits of
the capabilities. As for an aerospace example, we address a
notional example for Automatic dependent surveillancebroadcast
(ADSB) from Flight24 data (https://www.flightradar24.com/) to
determine whether blockchain is feasible for avionics systems.
The methods are incorporated into the Lightweight Internet of
Things (IoT) based Smart Public Safety (LISPS) framework. By
decoupling a complex system into independent sub-tasks, the
LISPS system possesses high flexibility in the design process
and online maintenance. The Blockchain-enabled decentralized
avionics services provide a secured data sharing and access
control mechanism. The experimental results demonstrate the
feasibility of the approach.
Index Terms—Avionics Systems, Surveillance, Blockchain, Cy-
ber Avionics, Flight24 data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Air travel has become increasing dense in time (e.g., air traf-
fic management), space (e.g., system wide information man-
agement), and frequency (e.g., communications) that places
increase burdens on avionics to support public safety and
security [17]. The future requires methods for increased cyber
security [30] for avionics systems [12].
Advances in software, hardware, and communication gener-
ate new opportunities for malicious activities (Fig 1). An ex-
ample is Automatic dependent surveillancebroadcast (ADSB)
which poses challenges for confidentiality, availability, and
integrity over security and safety concerns [27], [56], [69],
[79]. Current constructs include the system design as a cyber-
physical system (CPS), as well as the devices operating at
the edge to include the internet of things (IoT), that require
consideration to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. The continued
use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) increases the need for
cyber awareness [28], [50], [70] for aeronautical informatics
[33].
Cyber awareness concerns require new methods for security,
such as blockchain, for enhance performance over reliability,
resilience, and assurance. Areas of concern include:
• Networks The various fixed and wireless ground and
air constructs that enable the delivery of information to
and from the aircraft, ground, and space [72], [76], [77].
Examples include air traffic management (ATM) with
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
• Electronics The on-board avionics is subject to inter-
nal and external performance requirements against size,
weight, and power requirements. Examples include the
battery power [52] and sensors supporting engine control.
• Software As modern systems are operating with large
data, the control and run-time operations require sophisti-
cated methods for efficiency. Examples include integrated
modular avionics (IMA) [37].
• Analytics Availability, confidence, and processing of
systems is determined by the various standards in devel-
opment and deployment designs that meet performance
[1], [4] and effectiveness criteria [95]. Examples include
the compliance and mandates for Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS), video [18], or Automatic dependent surveil-
lancebroadcast (ADSB) [43] use.
• Communication A key aspect of cyber is the coordina-
tion of the signals that are transferred. For air operations,
the wireless signals from the space and air pathways need
to operate reliably [94]. Examples include performance-
based navigation and communications, surveillance, and
navigation (CNS) signals for coordinating flight.
• Data On the physical networks and communication
pathways, the data and protocols should provide infor-
mation with integrity and consistency [42]. Examples
include System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
capability for real-time support for collision avoidance.
Figure 1 highlights the growing concerns including soft-
ware, communication, and hardware attacks.The rest of the
paper is as follows. Section II provides a review of avionics
cyber concerns. Section III discusses microservices. Section
IV provides a discussion of the LISPS framework. Section V
provides an avionics use case. Section VI provides conclu-
sions.
II. BACKGROUND CYBER AVIONICS
In the last twenty years, the cyber-landscape in ATM has
evolved significantly, particularly in conjunction with advances
in hardware (e.g., wireless and Internet of things (IoT) de-
vices, networks (e.g., IP-based connectivity from Aeronautical
Fixed Telecommunication Networks (AFTN)), software (e.g.,
SESAR and NextGen technologies, including avionics ontolo-
gies [45], [46], [47], Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communi-
cation System (AeroMACS), etc.) [3]. The future of aviation
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2Fig. 1. Avionics Vulnerabilities.
includes greater amounts of data exchanged in real-time across
an increasing number of stakeholders.
A. Cyber Avionics Access Issues
Cyber-security was largely inherent in traditional ATM
systems thanks to the limited or null interconnectivity between
dedicated CNS/ATM subsystems. However, current ATM re-
quires highly interconnected Decision Support Tools (DST)
addressing the requirements of both strategic and tactical op-
erational timeframes. Currently, most Air Navigation Service
Providers (ANSP) implement the following CNS measures:
• Access protocols - Online submission of flight plans
and flight plan amendments [40] can only be performed
by authenticated and authorized users and is subject to
very detailed scrutiny (checks are performed to avoid
any intentional/unintentional duplication in flight crew,
aircraft, call-sign).
• Authentication and user restrictions especially in relation
to external entities participating to the collaborative deci-
sion making process (airlines, weather offices, handling
agents, airport management, etc.) [73].
Future techniques of emerging interest include blockchain
techniques for access and authentication security [49], [90].
B. Cyber Avionics Vulnerabilities
Encryption and tunnelling (IP-based interconnectivity): in-
creasingly adopted for ground-based telecommunication net-
works provide measures of development that continual need
to be designed to ensure that that methods are not subject to
attack. Essential to these methods are the confidence, integrity,
and availability (continuity) of the signals (see Fig. 1) being
used by avionics systems for effective performance [86].
Example threats that can severely affect future systems can
be categorized as firmware (software) and network (physical)
attacks.
Firmware Attacks:
• Supply Chain Attack: Gaining access to supplier com-
puters and modifying the firmware (e.g., pre-installing
back doors, malicious code, etc.)
• False Data Injection: Compromising a computer-
controlled sensor by injecting false data in computer-
driven data analysis/fusion process.
• False Code Injection: Providing addition software rou-
tines to alter processing, skip functions, or deny outputs.
• Firmware Modification: Interjecting software to alter the
processing of low-level device control and the operating
system that control data and manipulation functions.
• Malware Infection: Inserting software into the system
with deliberate harmful intent including viruses, worms,
back doors and Trojan horses.
Network Attacks:
• Jamming: Transmitting high power signals to impede
reception of radio frequency/electro-optical (RF/EO) sig-
nals (i.e., degrading accuracy and continuity) [84].
• Spoofing/Meaconing: Synthesizing and transmitting a
false signal [57] to deceive a target RF/EO sensors
positioning and/or tracking data; Meaconing refers to
capturing legitimate RF/EO signal and rebroadcasting
with alterations (e.g., time delay), affecting the RF/EO
sensor estimation accuracy, continuity and/or integrity
(e.g., GNSS [74], [96]).
• Denial of Service (DoS): DoS attacks can be launched
at any layer of an avionics system. In the physical layer,
the adversary can launch a jamming attack to interfere
with communication on physical channels. In the network
layer, the adversary can disrupt the routing protocol and
disconnect the network. In the application layer, the
adversary can shut down high-level services [85].
• Command Injection: Overtaking control by interjection
of access such as Buffer-Overflow Attack [51].
• False Data Injection: Manipulating the data such as a
data reply attack with available or new information [74].
• Network Isolation: Shutting down services to disconnect
the proper communication functions such as an ARP
(Address Resolution Protocol) Cache Poisoning approach
[74].
• Packet Access: Sniffing and fuzzifying the packets that
contain the data for direct access of to intend for addi-
tional information transfer to other systems [74].
C. ADS-B
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
for avionics allows aerospace systems to broadcast position,
air speed, and identification over a radio message at 1090 MHz
(see Fig. 2). It is lower cost than conventional radar systems,
enhances surveillance movement analysis, and increase pilot
situational awareness. The system composes 1) ground infras-
tructure, 2) airborne component, and 3) operating procedures.
ADS-B relies on the Global Positing System (GPS) or other
systems like the inertial navigation system (INS). Currently,
the line-of-sight range is 370 km.
“ADS-B out” is from the aircraft and provides functionality
to determine dynamics of turns and descent/ascent. ADS-B in
includes radio messages received by air traffic control stations
and other aircraft including platform traffic positions, weather
updates, and flight information. However, after deployment,
3Fig. 2. ADS-B (from http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/).
there were reports of message spoofing because the data was
not encrypted or authenticated [84]. Blockchain microservices
could be a solution for ADS-B security.
III. MICROSERVICES
There is a growing demand for human resources to interpret
the live data streams (e.g., from security cameras [13], [25],
[53]). Numerous automated object detection algorithms have
been investigated to atomize this process using statistical
analysis [36] or machine learning (ML) [71] approaches. The
ML methods are computationally expensive such as using
algorithms that are normally implemented for powerful cloud
servers for a surveillance system. For example, Wide Area
Motion Imagery (WAMI) streams video from sensors back to
the cloud for processing, which puts a heavy burden on the
communication network [88], [87]. To reduce data transmis-
sion, it has been suggested to promote operators awareness
by using context [15], [78] or providing query languages
[2]. Further, approaches such as re-configuring the networked
cameras [68], utilizing event-driven visualization [34], and
mapping conventional real-time images to camera images [54]
improve the efficiency and throughput of the communication
networks along with better detection rates.
Decentralized surveillance systems are more suitable in
many mission-critical, delay sensitive tasks [62]. Recent devel-
opments of the edge hierarchy architecture enables real-time
surveillance based on the fog computing paradigm [59]. Many
on-line and uninterrupted target tracking systems are proposed
to meet the requirements of real-time measurement processing
and instant decision making deployed at the edge [10], [32],
[81], [82]. Researchers also merged raw data streams from
drones on near-site fog computing devices to reduce the
amount of data to be outsourced to the cloud center [26].
A safety system focusing on object assessment can be
constructed following the edge-fog-cloud hierarchy [58]. The
input surveillance video frame is given to an edge unit where
low-level processing is performed, such as feature detection
and object tracking [9], [41], [64]. The intermediate-level
is in charge of action recognition, behavior understanding,
and decision making like abnormal event detection, which is
implemented at the fog stratum [63], [67]. Finally, the high-
level is focused on historical pattern analysis, algorithm fine
tuning, and global statistical analysis [14], [15], [19] such as
flight routes.
Exploring context services includes that of dynamic data
driven applications systems (DDDAS) [8], [16], [35] gathered
from scientific applications: (1) theory (e.g., estimation); (2)
methods (e.g., image computing for situation evaluation [97],
[98], [99], [100]); and (3) design (situation awareness through
contextual assessment). Enhance user interaction through a
user defined operating picture (UDOP) interface [5], [6], [7],
[20] for decision making [22].
The next sub-sections introduce the microservice architec-
ture and blockchain technology useful for avionics systems.
A. Microservices in IoT
A Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is widely adopted
in the development of application software in IoT and CPS
environments [24]. The traditional SOA utilizes a monolithic
architecture that constitutes different software features in a
single interconnected and interdependent application database.
Owing to the tightly coupled dependence among functions
and components, such a monolithic framework is difficult to
adapt to new requirements for IoT-enabled avionics systems,
such as scalability, service extensibility, data privacy, and
cross-platform interoperability [29], [31]. As an extension
of the traditional SOA, a microservices architecture allows
functional units of an application to work independently with a
loose coupling by encapsulating a minimal functional software
module as a microservice, which can be individually developed
and deployed. Each microservice is a process dedicated to
certain function of the application. The individual microser-
vices asynchronously communicate with each other through
a lightweight mechanism, such as an HTTP RESTful API or
a message bus [55]. Finally, multiple decentralized individ-
ual microservices cooperate with each other to perform the
functions of complex systems. The flexibility of microservices
enables continuous, efficient, and independent deployment of
application functional units.
Thanks to these attractive properties, such as fine granularity
and loose coupling, the microservices architecture has been
investigated in many smart solutions to enhance the scalability
and security of IoT-based applications. Current IoT systems
are advancing from things-oriented ecosystems to a widely
and finely distributed microservices-oriented ecosystems with
potential for avionics navigation. An Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) that incorporates and combines data approaches
using the serverless microservices architecture has been de-
signed and implemented to help the transportation planning
for the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system [39]. To enable a
more scalable and decentralized solution for advanced data
stream analysis for large volumes of distributed edge devices,
a conceptual design of a robust smart surveillance system was
proposed based on microservices architecture and blockchain
technology [66]. It aims at offering a scalable, decentralized
4Fig. 3. Blockchain Advantages.
and fine-grained access control solution for smart surveillance
systems.
B. Blockchain-enabled Security
As a fundamental technology of Bitcoin [61], blockchain
initially was used for new cryptocurrencies that perform
commercial transactions among independent entities without
relying on a centralized authority. Essentially, the blockchain
is a public ledger based on consensus rules to provide a
verifiable, append-only chained data structure of transactions.
Due to the decentralized architecture, blockchain allows the
data to be stored and updated, which makes blockchain an
ideal architecture to ensure distributed transactions among all
participants in a trustless environment, like avionics networks
(as shown in Fig. 3).
The blockchain consensus properties include:
• Validity (Correctness): If a honest node receives a valid
common replicate proposed by other nodes, this common
replicate should be accepted into the blockchain.
• Agreement (Consistency): All the honest node should
updates their local replicates of the blockchain with that
block header of confirmed global blockchain.
• Termination (Liveness): Every honest node should ei-
ther discard or accept new transactions into blockchain.
Finally, all transactions originated from the honest nodes
will be eventually confirmed.
• Integrity (Total order): All honest nodes should accept
the same chronological order of transactions which are
correctly appended to hash-chained blockchain.
Emerging from the intelligent property, a smart contract
allows users to achieve agreements among parties through
a blockchain network, Fig. 4. By using cryptographic and
security mechanisms, a smart contract combines protocols
with user interfaces to formalize and secure relationships
over networks [80]. A smart contract includes a collection
of pre-defined instructions and data that have been saved
at a specific address of blockchain as a Merkle hash tree,
which is a constructed bottom-to-up binary tree data struc-
ture. Through exposing public functions or application binary
interfaces (ABI), a smart contract interacts with users to offer
the predefined business logic or contract agreement. A smart
contract enhances trust, efficiency, accuracy, and autonomy.
The blockchain and smart contract enabled security mecha-
nism for applications have been reported recently, for example,
Fig. 4. Smart Contract.
smart surveillance system [60], identification authentication
[38], access control [48], [90], social credit system [92],
biomedical imaging data processing [89], and space situation
awareness [91], [93]. Thus, blockchain and smart contract
together are promising to provide a solution to enable a
secured data sharing and access authorization in decentralized
avionics systems.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The proposed microservices enabled blockchain network
for secure avionics framework follows the divide-and-conquer
principle to functionally decouple the processes for navigation
and system security. The computationally expensive processes
are divided into multiple sub-tasks. Based on the microservices
architecture, the proposed avionics system offers a completely
decentralized solution where sub-tasks of a function are hosted
by different hardware devices. An update or change of one
service does not affect the operation of the entire system
as long as it follows the same input and output relations.
In the system design, a Docker container is adopted for the
microservices architecture and the multi-layer platform is im-
plemented following the edge-fog-cloud computing paradigm.
The Lightweight IoT based Smart Public Safety (LISPS) sys-
tem architecture, which utilizes microservices-enabled private
blockchain network to secure navigation services, provides
secured data sharing. According to functionality and task
completion, all containerized microservices are divided into
four types and are deployed both at the edge and fog layer.
A. Safety Application Services
These microservices provide smart navigation application
functions, such as data processing, object identification, move-
ment features extraction, anomalous behavior recognition,
and alert actions. Real-time avionics streams are generated
by ADS-B messages and transmitted to edge microservices
for feature extraction. Lower level features are transferred
to fog nodes for data aggregation and higher level analytic
services, such as route pattern recognition and anomalous
event detection [83]. The light-weight Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) webservice is deployed at the host and is
responsible for data transfer between the edge and fog. Given
5Fig. 5. Systems Architecture of Blockchain ADS-B.
different capacities of the host platform, the smart navigation
services consist of edge services and fog services.
Network Application Services on the Edge: To reduce
network communication latency and overload, raw ADS-B
messages captured by navigation equipments are processed by
edge devices that conduct low-level feature extraction tasks,
such as aircraft identification and trajectories. The key function
of the features extraction task can be decoupled into multiple
microservices that are deployed on a single or multiple edge
devices and work cooperatively, as shown by Fig. 5. In the
aircraft tracking and identification (e.g., see [23]) microser-
vice, multiple frames are checked every second for feature
extraction through a lightweight convolutional neural network
(L-CNN) algorithm [65]. Then, a queue is maintained to track
the aircraft within a airspace box, based on a lightweight,
application. Finally, movement-based features, such as the
speed and direction changes, are extracted for each aircraft
in the data frame. The features for each aircraft of interest
are put into a dictionary format where the key is the object
first detection time and the value consists of all the features.
The extracted lower level feature is converted to a JSON
string and transferred to the fog layer using HTTP protocol
communication channel.
Network Application Services on the Fog: After extracted
feature data have been merged by the fog platform through
data streaming services, the higher-level feature contextual-
ization and smart decision making for a surveillance system
are available to support intelligent analytic functions. Prior to
the decision making process, the data should be contextualized
given significant factors, like the time of the day, the location
of the signal, and the security level of the ADS-B system. After
the contextualization, the features of each detected aircraft
in the frame are divided and separately processed by data
fusion logic microservices. Given pre-defined logic rules, the
suspicious activity level regarding an aircraft route anomaly
is returned. According to a threshold defined by the system
air traffic controller (ATC) based on the past experiences, the
decision making is performed using a suspicious activity level
(e.g., 80%). A text message is sent to the ATC if suspicion
level of an individual aircraft is beyond the pre-set threshold.
B. Blockchain-enabled Security Services
In the LISPS system, security policy covers two main
aspects: identity management and secured data accessing.
An identity management mechanism ensures a new node
enrollment process in the permissioned blockchain network.
Only authorized participants could be recognized by entities of
the network and perform blockchain services, such as mining
blocks, sending transactions and deploying smart contracts.
Compared to a public blockchain network, the permissioned
blockchain network achieves higher efficiency in consensus
operation, and more secure by limiting participants and clearly
defining security policies. The secured data accessing service
acts as a fundamental service pool, which includes three main
clusters: access control services, security policies services
and mining services. All the entities on the permissioned
blockchain network are implemented as containers, which
perform blockchain services independently on the host de-
vices. The containerized microservices could be categorized
as miners or non-mining nodes given the computation power
of the host devices.
Utilizing the microservices architecture, the security policy
functions are decoupled into multiple microservices and de-
ployed on distributed computing devices. These decentralized
security microservices work as a service cluster to offer a
scalable, flexible, and lightweight data sharing and access
control mechanisms for the LISPS system. An entity regis-
tration process is performed by the registration microservices
that associate entitys unique blockchain account address with
a Virtual ID (VID). The identity authentication microser-
vices expose RESTful APIs to other microservices-enabled
providers for referring identity verification results.
The security microservices act as data and security service
managers who deploy the smart contracts that encapsulate
identity authentication and the access control policies. After
the smart contracts have been deployed successfully on the
blockchain network, they become visible to the entire network.
The authorized participants could interact with smart contract
through the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interfaces. The
access control microservices encapsulate access control model
and perform access right validation during service granting
process on smart surveillance service providers.
6Fig. 6. CPU usage percentage in the edge units.
C. Trajectory Simulation Services
The trajectory simulation services combine multiple in-
dividual simulations models and techniques to implementa-
tion/model development stages of the simulation. The simula-
tion offers an enhanced representation of the system including:
• System dynamics simulation is implemented as two mi-
croservices: sensor dynamics and system dynamics. The
sensor dynamics simulation service could evaluate be-
havior of edge applications services and output estimates
for sensor measurements and access control change.
The system dynamics simulation services analyze the
nonlinear behaviors of fog computing system to perform
reconfiguration of the simulation models and system
services.
• Agent-based simulation simulates the action and inter-
action of autonomous-given behavior recognition results
from smart surveillance. Behavior recognition based on
extracted lower features allows the assessment of individ-
ual aircraft in the ADS-B reporting, and those individual
agents will be analyzed by agent-based simulation to
generate estimate for discrete event simulation.
• Discrete-event simulation combines estimates from agent-
based model and a discrete sequence of events in time
to model the operation of system. The event algorithm
analyzes those multiple objects and assesses an event
scenario during a certain period of time. In a discrete-
event simulation, the event could refer to actions of
aircraft in the airspace. The discrete-event simulation
estimates coordinate agent-based services for improving
accuracy.
Discrete event simulation and agent-based simulation mi-
croservices cooperate with each other under close feedback
loop to assist management services and mining services.
V. BLOCKCHAIN AVIONICS EXAMPLE
A concept-of-proof prototype system has been implemented
on a real physical network environment including a safety ap-
Fig. 7. Network latency of BlendCAC.
plication and blockchain-enabled security services using ADS-
B. The applications are decoupled as multiple microservices
that are developed as Docker images, and are deployed both
on fog and edge computing platform. A Raspberry PI acts as
an edge device while a laptop is adopted as the fog node. Key
metrics are assessed for performance and effectiveness over
awareness [75], support [21], veracity [44], and relevance [11].
Using the ADS-B, blockchain, and container-based systems;
we augment the contextualization models of both the quanti-
tative (processing needs) and the qualitative (social needs) for
the system. Preliminary results demonstrate that the system
performs in real time with edge units is utilized at 80%.
Figure 6 shows the advantage of the trajectory simulation
as the dynamic prediction models, agent-based approach to
container use, and simulations results direct the fog services
which reduces the processing time for the ADS-B average
analytics over a interval of 15× 100 messages.
The blockchain-enabled security services are built on a
permissioned blockchain network including six miners and
six non-miners participants. Two miners are deployed on a
laptop and other four miners are distributed on four desktops.
Each miner just use one CPU core to ensure they have
same computation resource. Two desktop and four Rasp-
berry PIs are non-miners to run security microservices. The
security microservices are developed as Docker containers
providing both Go-Ethereum as client application to inter-
act with blockchain network and Flask-based webservice to
handle security service request from user. To evaluate the
performance of the microservices-based security mechanism, a
service access experiment is carried out on a physical network
environment which includes 3 Raspberry PIs and 2 desktops.
One Raspberry PI works as a client to send service request,
while server side is the navigation service provider, which has
been both hosted on edge (Raspberry PI) and fog (desktop)
nodes. A blockchain enabled capability based access control
(BlendCAC) scheme [31, 90] is selected to enforce the access
control policies.
To evaluate the overall network latency incurred by the
microservices architecture, a comprehensive test has been
7performed on two service architectures: the microservices ar-
chitecture (Micro App) and the monolithic framework (Mono
App). Figure 7 shows the overall network latency incurred
and compares the execution time of the BlendCAC and a
benchmark without any access control enforcement on two
service architecture. Considering the scenarios without access
control enforcement, microservices and the monolithic frame-
work have almost the same performance both on edge (∼ 50
ms) and fog platform (∼ 48 ms). However, when it comes
to BlendCAC scenario, the experiments on two architectures
show different communication latencies between the fog and
edge platforms. Although microservices incurs more network
latency, which is 75 ms on the fog side and 7 ms on edge side,
it still brings benefits to the distributed ADS-B navigation-
based systems, such as loosely coupled dependence, easy
service deployment, and cross-platform interoperability.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Future avionics systems using ADS-B require enhanced
security to mitigate various attacks on the hardware, network,
and software. This paper presents a blockchain with smart
contract as a method to secure navigation communications,
with little latency. A microservice approach was presented
using the advantages of edge and fog computing.
Future developments would include testing on a UAV trans-
mitting and receiving ADS-B signals from both a cooperative
and a non-cooperative aircraft.
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